develops the notion of a "timelessly optimal" pre-commitment policy. This paper uses a simple business cycle model to illustrate this notion. We show that timelessly optimal policies are not unique and that they are not necessarily better than the time-consistent solution. Further, we describe a method for constructing optimal precommitment rules in an environment where the policymaker does not know the initial state of the economy. This latter solution is useful for characterizing the benefits policymakers extract through exploiting initial conditions.
1) Introduction
One of the more exciting developments in optimal policymaking is the "timelessly optimal" policy concept that Woodford (1999) introduced to the literature. Prior to Woodford (1999) optimal pre-commitment policies were solved using the methods first outlined in Kydland and Prescott (1980) and developed more fully in Currie and Levine (1993) . The problem associated with these earlier techniques is that they come with an "initial period problem." More precisely, they imply that policymakers behave very differently in the initial period than in subsequent periods. If the behavior in the initial period were repeated in later periods then the policy strategy would no longer be optimal.
Thus Currie and Levine's (1993) treatment of pre-commitment cannot be formulated as a recursive optimization problem. Woodford's (1999) innovation was to consider the optimization problem from a "timeless perspective," an innovation directed at eliminating this initial period problem. The timeless perspective argues that a policymaker optimizing today should not exploit the initial state of the economy, but rather implement the policy that it would have chosen to implement today if it had been optimizing from a time period far in the past. As we shall see, while the timeless perspective overcomes the initial period problem, it does so at a cost. There is a continuum of solutions, each of which fully satisfies the requirements to be timelessly optimal; that is, the timeless perspective lends itself to indeterminacy.
Alongside this literature on the timeless perspective, other authors (such as King and Wolman, 1999 , Khan et al, 2000 , and Amato and Laubach, 2001 ) depart from Currie and Levine (1993) in that they assume that the economy is in steady state in the period prior to some initial optimization. With this assumption these authors rule out any exploitation of the initial state vector. However, as we show below, assuming the economy is in steady state in the initial period does not generally lead to a timelessly optimal policy because the initial period is still treated differently than subsequent periods.
In this paper we use a simple business cycle model to illustrate Woodford's (1999) timeless perspective, as described in Svensson and Woodford (1999) . We compare timelessly optimal policies with the Currie and Levine (1993) solution and draw out the nature of the indeterminacy. We also motivate and describe a solution procedure that constructs optimal pre-commitment rule in the case where the policymaker does not observe, and therefore cannot exploit, the initial state of the economy. This paper is structured as follows. In the following Section we describe the simple business cycle model that we use to illustrate the ideas in the paper. Section 3 describes the optimal pre-commitment solution, as developed in Currie and Levine (1985, 1993) .
In Section 4 we turn to Woodford's (1999) timeless perspective. We show that there is a continuum of solutions that are all timelessly optimal and we relate this indeterminacy to the problem of assigning value to past commitments. In Section 5 we motivate an alternative optimal policy in which the policymaker must choose its decision rule without knowing the past history of the state vector. We relate this solution to Svensson and Woodford (1999) , to Currie and Levine (1993) , and to King and Wolman (1999) . Section 6 concludes.
2) A Simple Business Cycle Model
To ensure that our analysis is as transparent as possible we employ a very simple business cycle model. Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive environment.
They employ labor for production and choose the price of their good subject to a downward sloping demand curve and a real cost of adjusting their price level. An aggregator, takes the firms' outputs and bundles them into a single consumption good that it sells to households in a perfectly competitive market. Households choose their level of consumption, holdings of real money balances, and stock of bonds to take into the next period, subject to their budget constraint. Further, households make a laborleisure choice. The government chooses the level of the nominal interest rate, supplies households with whatever level of nominal money balances they demand, and remits any seignorage revenues to households through lump sum transfers. As shown in Walsh (2001) , when log-linearized about its deterministic steady state, this business cycle model can be represented as
In equations (1) and (2), c t is consumption, π t is inflation, i t is the nominal interest rate, g t is a demand shock, and u t is a cost push shock. Turning to the parameters, ρ is the rate of time preference, β is the discount factor, σ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, and α indexes firms' price markup over marginal costs. π* is the steady-state inflation rate whose value is determined by the interaction of the government's interest rate rule with equations (1) and (2). The shocks, g t and u t are independent zero mean finite variance processes.
2.1) Policy Objectives
Equation (1) is a necessary condition arising from the households' constrained optimization problem. It is derived from an additively separable constant elasticity of substitution utility function. Woodford (2000) derives conditions under which the following objective function can correctly be employed as a second order approximation to the representative agent's utility function.
In equation (3), πˆand ĉ ( ĉ > 0) are the target values for inflation and consumption that are chosen by the government. The parameters ω, ν ≥ 0, are in principle determined by the preference and technology parameters characterizing the model. However, in applications these policy preference parameters are more usually interpreted as parameters that determine the type of the central banker appointed by the government.
The government specifies the target values for consumption and inflation, but delegates the job of achieving these targets to an instrument independent central banker. Because of monopolistic competition output in deterministic steady state will be less than the perfectly competitive level. The parameter ĉ can be thought of as reflecting this lost output. Under the time-consistent policy ĉ > 0 leads to an inflation bias (see Clarida et al. 1999) , effectively because the central banker has been directed to alter the real side of the economy in a model that is super-neutral.
3) The Optimal Pre-commitment Rule
Let the period at which optimization is taking place be period s. Construct the
Minimizing the Lagrangian with respect to 
along with the initial conditions 0 2 1
(see Currie and Levine, 1993) . The nature of the policy strategy is to exploit initial conditions in the first period, but to promise never to do so in the future. The current value of promises not to exploit the 
part of the optimal policy program, which provides the initial conditions necessary to close the system.
Because the system has been log-linearized around its deterministic steady state, it is a simple matter to extract from equations (4) - (8) (from equation (7)). Then, combining equation (4) Before leaving this Section it is useful to outline from an implementation point of view the nature of the equilibrium just described. It is envisaged that optimization takes place only once, in period s (making period s special). Subsequent to period s the policymaker's hands are tied (the policymaker has pre-committed). The solution to the optimization problem provides a state contingent rule that describes how the instrument is to be set in every possible state of the world. Moreover, the feedback parameters in this state contingent rule are explicit functions of the parameters in the model and objective function. Therefore, if a change to one or more parameters occurs, the policy rule automatically reflects this change; there is no need for re-optimization to take place.
4) The "Timeless Perspective" and "Timelessly" Optimal Pre-commitment Rules 1
In the solution described above the initial values for the two Lagrange multipliers are driven to zero as a consequence of optimal policy behavior. Policymakers exploit the fact that when they set their instrument in the first period, agents have already formed their expectations and the policymaker is unconstrained by past commitments. While they exploit expectations in the first period, this exploitation comes with promises never to do so again. Woodford (1999) The solution to this problem that Woodford (1999) and Svensson and Woodford (1999) arrive at is for policymakers to "…adopt, not the pattern of behavior from now on that it would now be optimal to choose, taking previous expectations as given, but rather the pattern of behavior to which it would have wished to commit itself to at a date far in the past, contingent upon the random events that have occurred in the meantime." (Woodford, 1999, pp293, italics in original) "…select a policy rule for behavior in periods t ≥ s to which it would have been optimal to commit oneself in a period far in the past." (Svensson and Woodford, 1999, pp17) They term this approach the "timeless perspective." To illustrate the timeless perspective to pre-commitment, consider the special case where ν = 0, which leads to 0
1 Our description of the timeless perspective follows that presented in Svensson and Woodford Combining equations (4), (5), and (8), and using the result that π π* = we obtain the second order equation By inspection, one root is greater than one, the other less than one. Denote the stable root Now imagine that at some earlier point in time, say period k, the policymaker solves for the optimal pre-commitment rule, exploiting expectations and ignoring past commitments (1999) . 
It is clear from equations (10) - (12) that the state of the system in period t depends explicitly on the length of time that has passed since the period k optimization took place:
t-k. Svensson and Woodford (1999) term the solution given in equations (10) - (12) the "k-optimal" equilibrium 2 to indicate that it describes the equilibrium that is optimal given that initial conditions are exploited in period k. If we now take the limit of equations (10) - (12) 
Comparing equations (10) - (12) with equations (13) -(15), notice that in this limit the intercepts in equations (10) -(12) tend to α ωĉ , πˆ, and 0, respectively. In each case these intercepts equal the steady-state value of the variable in question. We are now in a position to describe the conditions required for a policy rule to be timelessly optimal. A policy rule is timelessly optimal if provided it has been followed for a sufficient length of time, and provided agents expect the rule to be followed in the future, the system converges to the stationary optimal equilibrium. Alternatively, for a policy to be timelessly optimal it must satisfy the following two criteria:
• If the economy has arrived at its present state according to the stationary optimal equilibrium, then the policy rule chosen today must ensure that it continues to evolve according to the stationary optimal equilibrium.
• If the economy has not arrived at its present state according to the stationary optimal equilibrium, then the policy rule chosen today must ensure that the economy converges asymptotically to the stationary optimal equilibrium.
With Currie and Levine's (1993) To underscore that the problem the policymaker faces is to find a way of appropriately tying its hands during successive re-optimizations, we have deliberately expressed each prescription in terms of a setting for 2 1 − s λ . Each of these methods for valuing past commitments, which is to be applied period by period, leads to a timelessly optimal equilibrium because each of these valuation rules "…implies eventual convergence to the stationary optimal equilibrium ... regardless of the initial conditions when the policy is adopted." (Svensson and Woodford, 1999 pp18, italics in original) . If the economy is evolving according to the stationary optimal equilibrium, then each of these valuation rules leads to identical valuations of past commitments. But these rules will typically provide different valuations if the economy has arrived at period s-1 along an out of "stationary optimal equilibrium" path.
Of course, there are many ways of tying the policymaker's hands in addition to the few possibilities listed above. Applications of the timeless perspective (such as Walsh, 2001 and McCallum and Nelson, 2000) typically assume that past commitments are valued according to the second rule in the list above, but this is only one of many possible assumptions. Finally, notice that because past commitments are not valued optimally when viewed from any given period, it is not necessarily the case that timelessly optimal rules lead to better outcomes than the time-consistent rule.
5) Optimal Policy from Behind a Veil of Uncertainty
Assessing the benefit that accrues to having a pre-commitment mechanism simply requires comparing the pre-commitment solution (Section 3) with the time-consistent solution (see Dennis 2001) . In this Section we will develop an approach that allows us to assess the benefit that accrues to being able to exploit the initial state of the economy. As we will see, the solution we develop has much in common with that employed in King and Wolman (1999), Khan et al., (2000) , and Amato and Laubach (2001) , although it is not assumed that their approach is motivated on the following construct.
Consider a policymaker in the following hypothetical situation; the policymaker is behind a veil of uncertainty. While it knows the policy objective function, the policy constraints, the ex ante distribution of the shocks and the current date, the policymaker does not know the state of the economy. From behind this veil the policymaker must construct and implement its optimal policy. After the policy has been in effect for one period the veil is lifted and the state of the economy is revealed. From then on the policymaker implements the continuation policy, fully aware of, and accounting for, any shocks that have occurred. In the setting described, uncertainty about the state of the economy affects how the policymaker sets policy in the first period.
The effect of the uncertainty is to force the policymaker to take a guess at what the state of the economy is prior to the veil of uncertainty being removed. This guess will have welfare implications and the policymaker will take as its guess the state vector that optimizes the objective function. In what follows we will implement this procedure in two stages. In the first stage we construct the Euler equations for optimal policy; in the second stage we evaluate the policy objective function -for a guess at the initial state vector -and then optimize the objective function with respect to this guess. This twostage solution procedure makes full use of the property that the parameters in the optimal feedback rule are independent of the state vector. Notice that, as with Section 3, the nature of the solution is for the policymaker to optimize just once and for the statecontingent rule developed at that time to be implemented from then on. Thus the only difference between this solution and that in Section 3 is how the policymaker values past commitments in the initial period; the solution we develop is very unlikely to be timelessly optimal and is not intended to be so.
From behind the veil of uncertainty the Lagrangian for the optimization problem is
Relative to the Lagrangian in Section 3, we have replaced a conditional expectation with an expectation operator that reflects the policymaker's subjective probabilistic beliefs 
We denote the policymaker's guesses of the two state variables Alternatively, if the policymaker knows the state of the economy in period s-1, then the unconditional expectation in equation (16) . In other words, when the initial state is unobserved, the best that the policymaker can do is to assume that the economy is in steady state and set policy for the initial period accordingly. Setting the Lagrange multipliers equal to their steady state values was one of the approaches taken in King and Wolman (1999) and Khan et al., (2000) , but this approach is not timelessly optimal unless the Lagrange multipliers are constant in the stationary optimal equilibrium (cf. McCallum and Nelson, 2000, pp5-6) . If the above approach were followed recursively, then in each period the Lagrange multipliers would be set equal to their steady-state values. Alternatively, if the initial period were treated in the same way as subsequent periods, then the Lagrange multipliers in the initial period would be a function of the history of the state vector.
6) Conclusions
In this paper we have presented and discussed a recent development -the timeless perspective -that has taken place in the optimal monetary policy rules literature. We used a simple business cycle model to illustrate the derivation and characteristics of timelessly optimal pre-commitment policies, and compared these policies with the "standard" pre-commitment solution. An advantage of the timeless approach to precommitment is that it transforms a one-shot optimization problem (the standard precommitment solution) into a recursive problem with optimization occurring each period.
But because of their recursive formulation timelessly optimal pre-commitment policies are indeterminate with different policies arising as a function of how the current policymaker values past commitments. We demonstrated this indeterminacy and described the particular solution applications of the timeless perspective have tended to focus on.
Finally, in Section 5 we introduced a construct that allows us to assess the benefits that arise because the policymaker knows the initial state of the economy when optimizing.
